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Abstract 
We introduce a logic for reasoning about evi­
dence, that essentially views evidence as a func­
tion from prior beliefs (before making an obser­
vation) to posterior beliefs (after making the ob­
servation). We provide a sound and complete ax­
iomatization for the logic, and consider the com­
plexity of the decision problem. Although the 
reasoning in the logic is mainly propositional, 
we allow variables representing numbers and 
quantification over them. This expressive power 
seems necessary to capture important properties 
of evidence. 
1 Introduction 
Consider the following situation, essentially taken from 
[Halpern and Tuttle 1993; Fagin and Halpern 1994]. A 
coin is tossed, which is either fair or double-headed. The 
coin lands heads. How likely is it that the coin is double­
headed? What if the coin is tossed 20 times and it lands 
heads each time? Intuitively, it is much more likely that the 
coin is double-headed in the latter case than in the former. 
But how should the likelihood be measured? A straight­
forward application of probability theory, perhaps the best 
candidate, is not possible here. We cannot compute, for 
instance, the probability of the coin being double-headed; 
assigning a probability to that event requires that we have 
a prior probability on the coin being double-headed. For 
example, if the coin was chosen at random from a barrel 
with one billion fair coins and one double-headed coin, it 
is still overwhelmingly likely that the coin is fair, and that 
the sequence of 20 heads is just unlucky. However, in the 
problem statement, there is no prior probability mentioned. 
We could of course posit a prior probability and see how the 
posterior probability behaves when we change the prior, but 
the point is that our intuition does not seem to rely on such 
a posited prior. 
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The main feature of this situation is that it involves a combi­
nation of probabilistic outcomes (e.g., the coin tosses) and 
nonprobabilistic outcomes (e.g., the choice of the coin). 
There has been a lot of work on reasoning about sys­
tems that combine both probabilistic and nondeterminis­
tic choices (e.g., [Vardi 1985; Fischer and Zuck !988; 
Halpern, Moses, and Tuttle 1988; van Glabbeek, Smolka, 
Steffen, and Tofts 1990; Larsen and Skou 1991; Halpern 
and Tuttle 1993; de Alfaro 1998]). However, the observa­
tions above suggest that if we attempt to formally analyze 
this situation in one of those frameworks, which essentially 
permit only the modeling of probabilities, we will not be 
able to directly capture this intuition about increasing like­
lihood. To see how this plays out, consider a formal analy­
sis of the situation in the Halpern-Tuttle [ 1993] framework. 
Suppose that Alice nonprobabilistically chooses one of two 
coins: a fair coin with probability 1/2 of landing heads, or 
a double-headed coin with probability 1 of landing heads. 
Alice tosses this coin repeatedly. Let 'Pk be a formula stat­
ing: "the kth coin toss lands heads". What is the probabil­
ity of <p k according to Bob, who does not know which coin 
Alice chose? 
According to the Halpern-Tuttle framework, this can be 
modeled by considering the set of runs describing the states 
of the system at each point in time, and partitioning this set 
into two subsets, one for each coin used. In the set of runs 
where the fair coin is used, the probability of 'Pk is 1/2; in 
the set of runs where the double-headed coin is used, the 
probability of <p k is 1. In this setting, the only conclusion 
that can be drawn is (Prs('Pk) = 1/2) V (Prs('Pk) = 1). 
(This is of course the probability from Bob's point of view; 
Alice presumably knows which coin she is using.) Intu­
itively, this seems reasonable: if the fair coin is chosen, the 
probability that the kth coin toss lands heads, according to 
Bob, is 1/2; if the double-headed coin is chosen, the prob­
ability is 1. Since Bob does not know which of the coins is 
being used, that is all that can be said. 
But now suppose that, before the JOist coin toss, Bob 
learns the result of the first I 00 tosses. Suppose, moreover, 
that all of these landed heads. What is the probability that 
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the 101st coin toss lands heads? By the same analysis, it is 
still either 1/2 or 1, depending on which coin is used. 
This is hardly useful. To make matters worse, no matter 
how many coin tosses Bob witnesses, the probability that 
the next toss lands heads remains unchanged. But this an­
swer misses out on some important information. The fact 
that all of the first 100 coin tosses are heads is very strong 
evidence that the coin is in fact double-headed. Indeed, a 
straightforward computation using Bayes' Rule shows that 
if the prior probability of the coin being double-headed is 
C>, then after observing that all of the 100 tosses land heads, 
the probability of the coin being double-headed becomes 
C> + 2-100(1- e>) 2100(> + (1- e>) . 
However, note that it is not possible to determine the pos­
terior probability that the coin is double-headed (or that 
the 101st coin toss is heads) without the prior probabil­
ity C>. After all, if Alice chooses the double-headed coin 
with probability only 1 o-100, then it is still overwhelm­
ingly likely that the coin used is in fact fair, and that Bob 
was just very unlucky to see such a nonrepresentative se­
quence of coin tosses. 
We are not aware of any framework for reasoning about 
nondeterminism and probability that takes the issue of ev­
idence into account. On the other hand, evidence has 
been discussed extensively in the philosophical literature. 
Much of this discussion occurs in the philosophy of sci­
ence, specifically confirmation theory, where the concern 
has been historically to assess the support that evidence ob­
tained through experimentation lends to various scientific 
theories [Carnap 1962; Popper 1959; Good 1950; Milne 
1996]. (Kyburg [1983] provides a good overview of the 
literature.) 
In this paper, we introduce a logic for reasoning about evi­
dence. Our logic extends a logic defined by Fagin, Halpern 
and Meggido [1990] (FHM from now on) for reasoning 
about likelihood expressed as either probability or belief. 
The logic has first-order quantification over the reals (so 
includes the theory of real closed fields), as does the FHM 
logic, for reasons that will shortly become clear. We add 
observations to the states, and refine the language to talk 
about both the prior probability of hypotheses and the pos­
terior probability of hypotheses, taking into consideration 
the observation at the states. We provide an additional op­
erator to talk about the evidence carried by particular ob­
servations. This lets us write formulas that talk about the 
relationship between the prior and posterior probabilities, 
and the evidence of the observations. 
We then provide a sound and complete axiomatization for 
the logic. To obtain such an axiomatization, we seem 
to need first-order quantification in a fundamental way. 
Roughly speaking, this is because ensuring that the evi­
dence operator has the appropriate properties requires us 
to assert the existence of suitable probability measures. It 
does not seem possible to do this without existential quan­
tification. Finally, we consider the complexity of the sat­
isfiability problem. The satisfiability problem for the full 
language requires doubly-exponential time, since it incor­
porates the theory of real closed fields, for which such a 
lower bound is known [Weispfenning 1988]. However, we 
show that the satisfiability problem for a propositional frag­
ment of the language, which is still strong enough to allow 
us to express many properties of interest, is NP-complete. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next 
section, we formalize a notion of evidence that captures 
the intuitions outlined above. In Section 3, we introduce 
our logic for reasoning about evidence. In Section 4, we 
present an axiomatization for the logic and show that it is 
sound and complete with respect to the intended models. In 
Section 5, we discuss the complexity of the decision prob­
lem of our logic. 
2 Measures of confirmation and evidence 
In order to develop a logic for reasoning about evidence, we 
need to first formalize an appropriate notion of evidence. 
Evidence has been studied in depth in the philosophical lit­
erature, under the name of confirmation theory. Confirma­
tion theory aims at determining and measuring the support 
a piece of evidence provides a hypothesis. As we men­
tioned in the introduction, many different measures of con­
firmation have been proposed in the literature. Typically, a 
proposal has been judged on the degree to which it satisfies 
various properties that are considered appropriate for con­
firmation. For example, it may be required that a piece of 
evidence e confirms a hypothesis h if and only if e makes 
h more probable. We have no desire to enter the debate as 
to which class of measures of confirmation is more appro­
priate. For our purposes, most confirmation functions are 
useless: they assume that we have a prior on the hypothe­
ses, which is exactly the information we do not have and do 
not want to assume. One exception is measures of evidence 
that use the log-likelihood ratio. Given an observation ob, 
the degree of confirmation that it provides for a hypothesis 
h is 
l(ob h)=lo (Pr(ob\h))· ' g Pr(ob \ h) 
That is, the degree of confirmation is the ratio is between 
the probability of observing ob when h holds versus the 
probability of observing ob when h does not hold. (The 
notation h represents the case where hypothesis h does not 
hold.) A logarithm is used to ensure that the measure is 
positive when it confirms the hypothesis. This approach 
has been advocated by Good [1950, 1960], among others.1 
1 In the literature, confirmation is usually taken with respect to 
some background knowledge. For ease of exposition, we ignore 
background knowledge here, although it can easily be incorpo-
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One problem with the log-likelihood ratio measure l, as we 
have defined it, is that it can only be used to reason about 
evidence discriminating between two competing hypothe­
ses, namely between an hypothesis h holding and the hy­
pothesis h not holding. We would like a measure of con­
firmation along the lines of the log-likelihood ratio mea­
sure, but that can handle multiple competing hypotheses. 
One such generalization was given by Shafer [1982], in the 
context of the Dempster-Shafer theory of evidence based 
on belief functions [Shafer 1976], and studied by Walley 
[ 1987]. The description here is taken mostly from [Halpern 
and Fagin 1992], 
We start with a set 7-{ = { h1, ... , hn} of mutually exclu­
sive and exhaustive hypotheses; thus, exactly one hypoth­
esis holds at any given time. Assume a finite set 0 of ob­
servations (or pieces of evidence). and assume that for each 
hypotheses h E 7-{ we have a probability space (0, 2°, J.Lh) 
that assigns to every observation ob E 0 the probability of 
ob given that hypothesis h holds. Furthermore, we assume 
that the observations in 0 are relevant to the hypotheses: 
for every observation ob E 0, there must be an hypothesis 
h such that J.Lh ( ob) > 0. We define an evidence space (over 
7-{ and 0) to be a tuple £= (7-l, 0 ,  J.Lh1, • • •  , J.Lhnl· 
Given an evidence space £, we define the weight that the 
observation ob lends to hypothesis h, written we( ob, h) or 
simply w( ob, h) when £ is understood, as 
(1) 
For a set of hypotheses H, we define we( ob, H) as simply 
the sum of the individual we( ob, h) for hE H. This defini­
tion makes we( ob, ·)a probability measure on hypotheses, 
for each fixed observation ob. Intuitively, if we ( ob, h) = 1, 
then ob fully confirms h (i.e., h is certainly true if ob is ob­
served), while if we ( ob, h) = 0, then ob disconfirms h 
(i.e., h is certainly false if ob is observed). We can ver­
ify that this is a generalization of the log-likelihood ra­
tio measure. More precisely, given an evidence space £ 
with 17-lJ = 2, then for a fixed observation ob, we( ob, ·) 
induces the same relative order on hypotheses as l( ob, ·), 
and for a fixed hypothesis h, we(·, h) induces the same 
relative order on observations as l (-, h). That is, for all 
ob, ob', h, and h', we( ob, h) :::>: we( ob, h') if and only 
if l(ob,h) :::>: l(ob,h') and we(ob,h) :::>: w&(ob',h) if 
and only if l(ob, h) :::>: l(ob', h). Intuitively, the weight 
we( ob, h) is the probability that h is the right hypothesis 
in the light of observation ob.2 The advantages of We over 
other known measures of confirmation are (a) that it it ap­
plicable when there is no prior probability distribution on 
rated into the framework we present. 
2We could have taken the log of the ratio to make w10 more 
in line with the log-likelihood ratio l defined earlier, but there 
are technical advantages in having the weight of evidence be a 
number between 0 and I. 
the hypotheses, (b) that it is applicable when there are more 
than two competing hypotheses, and (c) that it has a fairly 
intuitive probabilistic interpretation.3 
Although we ( ob, ·) behaves like a probability measure on 
hypotheses for every observation ob, it is perhaps best not 
to think of it as a probability. Rather, it is an encoding 
of evidence. But what is evidence? Halpern and Fagin 
[1992] have suggested that evidence can be thought of as a 
function mapping a prior probability on the hypotheses to 
a posterior probability, based on the piece of evidence wit­
nessed. The weight We can be thought of as representing 
such a function. In fact, as pointed out by Halpern and Fa­
gin [1992], we( ob, ·) can be used to "update" a prior prob­
ability f.lo on the hypotheses 7-{ into a probability f.lob· after 
observing ob by applying Dempster's Rule of Combination 
[Shafer 1976] That is, 
f.lob = f.lo EB we( ob, ·) , (2) 
where EB combines two probability distributions on 7-{ to 
get a new probability distribution on 7-{ defined as follows: 
Essentially, Dempster's Rule is simulating the effects of 
Bayes' Rule here. 
Example 2.1: To get a feel for how this measure of evi­
dence can be used, consider a variation of the two-coins 
example in the introduction. Assume that the coin chosen 
by Alice is either double-headed or fair, and consider se­
quences of hundred tosses of that coin. Let 0 = { m : 
0 :'::: m :'::: 100} (the number of heads observed), and let 
7-{ = { F, D}, where F is "the coin is fair", and D is "the 
coin is double-headed". The probability spaces associated 
with the hypotheses are generated by the following proba­
bilities for simple observations m: 
1 (100) 
f.lF(m) = 2Ioo m 
J.LD(m) = { 0
1 if m = 100 
otherwise. 
(We extend by additivity to the whole space 0.) For any 
3 Another representation that has similar characteristics is 
Shafer's original representation of evidence via belief functions 
[Shafer 1976], given essentially by 
w(ob , H) = maxhEHf.lh(ob)_ maxhEH f.lh ( ob) 
This measure is known in statistical hypothesis testing as the gen­
eralized likelihood-ratio statistic. It is another generalization of 
the log-likelihood ratio measure l. At this point, one may well ask 
what could help decide which weight function to use. In the case 
of these two particular notions of evidence, their main difference 
is in how they behave when one considers the combination of ev­
idence. Arguably, the measure that we have used behaves better 
in this case [Walley 1987; Halpern and Fagin 1992]. 
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observation m # 100, the weight in favor ofF is given by 
1 eoo) 
w(m , F) = zml 710o) = 1, O+zm m 
which intuitively means that the support of m is uncon­
ditionally provided to F; indeed, any such sequence of 
tosses cannot appear with the double-headed coin. Thus, 
if m > 0, we get that 
0 w(m, D) = 1 (100) = 0. O+zm m 
What happens when the hundred coin tosses are all heads? 
It is straightforward to check that 
1 
( zm w100,F)= 1 1+zm 
1 w(lOO,D) = 1 1+zm 
1 
1 + 2100 
2100 
1 + 2100' 
this time there is overwhelmingly more evidence in favor 
of D than F. 
Note that we have not assumed any prior probability. Thus, 
we cannot talk about the probability that the coin is fair or 
double-headed. What we have is a quantitative assessment 
of the evidence in favor of one of the hypotheses. However, 
if we assume a prior probability a on the coin being fair and 
m heads are observed after 100 tosses, then the probability 
that the coin is fair is 1 if m # 100; if m = 100 then, 
applying the rule of combination, the posterior probability 
of the coin being fair is aj(a + (1 - a)2100).1 
Can we characterize weight functions using a small num­
ber of properties? More precisely, given sets H and 0, and 
a function f from 0 x H to [0, 1], can we give properties of 
f that ensure that there are probability measures { J.Lh hErt 
such that f = wt;? As we saw before, for a fixed observa­
tion ob, f acts like a probability measure on H. However, 
this is not sufficient to guarantee that f is a weight function. 
Consider the following example, with 0 = { ob1, ob2} and 
H= {h1,h2, h3}: 
f( ob1, hi) 
f( ob1 , h2) 
f( ob1, h3) 
1/4 
1/4 
1/2 
f( ob2, hi) 
j(ob2, h2) 
j(ob2, h3) 
1/4 
1/2 
1/4. 
It is straightforward to check that f ( oh, · ) and f ( ob2, · ) 
are probability measures on H, but that there is no evi­
dence space £= (H, 0 ,  Jlh, Jlh, Jlh3) such that f = W£. 
The following result provides a complete characterization 
of weight functions. 
Theorem 2.2: Let H { h1, ... , hrn} and 0 = 
{oh, ... , obn}, and let f be a real-valued function with 
domain 0 x H such that f(ob, h) E [0, 1]. Then there ex­
ists an evidence space [ = (H, 0, Jlh1, • • •  , Jlhm) such that 
f = W£ if and only iff satisfies the following properties: 
WFl. for every ob E 0, f( ob, · ) is a probability mea­
sure on H, 
WF2. there exists X1, ... , Xn 2': 0 such that, for all h E 
H, 2:,�1 !(obi, h)xi = 1. 
This characterization is fundamental to the completeness 
of the axiomatization of the logic we introduce in the next 
section. 
3 Reasoning about evidence 
We introduce a logic £fo·ev for reasoning about evidence, 
inspired by a logic introduced in FHM. The logic has both 
propositional features and first-order features. We take the 
probability of propositions, and view evidence as a propo­
sition. On the other hand, we allow first-order quantifi­
cation over numerical quantities, such as probabilities and 
evidence. The logic essentially considers two time periods, 
which can be thought of as the time before an observation 
is made and the time after an observation is made. For sim­
plicity, we assume that exactly one observation is made. 
Thus, we can talk of the probability of a formula <p before 
an observation is made, denoted Pr0(<p), the probability of 
<p after the observation, denoted Pr( <p ), and the evidence of 
the observation ob for a hypothesis h, denoted we( ob, h). 
Of course, we want to be able to use the logic to relate all 
these quantities. 
Formally, we start with two sets of primitive propositions, 
.Ph = { h1, ... , hnh} representing the hypotheses, and 
<ti0 = { ob1, ... , obnJ representing the observations. Let 
Lh (.Ph) be the propositional sub language of hypothesis for­
mulas obtained by taking primitive propositions in .Ph and 
closing off under negation and conjunction; we use p to 
range over formulas of that sub language. 
A basic term has the form Pr0(p), Pr(p), or we( ob, p), 
where p is an hypothesis formula, and ob is an observa­
tion. A polynomial term has the form l11t1 + · · · + lintn, 
where Iii, i = 1, ... , n, is a real number and ti is a prod­
uct of basic terms and variables (which intuitively range 
over the reals). A polynomial inequality formula has the 
form p :::: a, where p is a polynomial term and a is a real 
number. Let [_fo·ev(<t>h, <ti0) be the language obtained by 
starting out with the primitive propositions in .Ph and <li0 
and polynomial inequality formulas, and closing off under 
conjunction, negation, and first-order quantification. 
We use obvious abbreviations where needed, such as <p V 1/J 
for �( �<p II �1/J ), <p =? 1/J for �<p V 1/J, :Jx<p for �Vx( �<p ), 
Pr( <p)- Pr( 1/J) :;:: a for Pr( <p) + ( -1 )Pr( 1/J) 2': a, Pr( <p) 2': 
Pr(1/J) for Pr(<p)- Pr(1/J) 2': 0, Pr(<p) :":a for -Pr(<p) 2': 
-a, Pr(<p) < a for �(Pr(<p) 2': a) , and Pr(<p) = a for 
(Pr(<p):::: a) II (Pr(<p) :<::a) (and analogous abbreviations 
for inequalities involving Pr0 and we). 
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Example 3.1: Consider again the situation given in Ex­
ample 2.1. Let <!>0, the observations, consist of primitive 
propositions of the form heads[m], where m is an integer 
with 0 :S m ::; 100, indicating that m heads out of 100 
tosses have appeared. Let <Ph consist of the two primitive 
propositions fair and doubleheaded. The computations in 
Example 2.1 can be written as follows: 
we(heads[lOO], fair) = 1/(1 + 2100)A 
we(heads[lOO], doubleheaded) = 2100 /(1 + 2100) . 
We can also represent the rule of combination, for a fixed 
prior probability a: 
Pr0(fair) =at\ 
we(heads[lOO], fair) = 1/(1 + 2100) => 
Pr(fair) = a/(a + (1 - a)2100). 
We will develop a deductive system to derive such conclu­
sions in the next section. I 
Now we consider the semantics. As usual, a model is a set 
of possible worlds. A world describes which hypothesis is 
true and which observation was made (recall that we have 
assumed that exactly one hypothesis is true, and exactly 
one observation is made), together with a probability dis­
tribution describing the prior probability, which is used to 
interpret Pr0. Thus, a world has the form ( h, ob, f1.), where 
h is a hypothesis, ob is an observation, and J.1. is a probabil­
ity distribution on 1> h. In addition, to interpret we, we need 
an evidence space over <Ph and 1>0, which gives a probabil­
ity measure f.i.h on <Po for each hypothesis h E <Ph. Thus, 
we take an evidential structure M to be a tuple (S x P, £), 
where S � <Ph x <l>0, Pis a set of probability distributions 
on <Ph, and [ is an evidence space over <Ph and 1>0• Note 
that the states of the structure are required to be only a sub­
set of <Ph x 1>0• Roughly speaking, this allows us to encode 
a priori information about the particular situation within the 
structure. Typically, such a priori information will rule out 
a particular combination of hypothesis and observation. 
To interpret propositional formulas in L:h(<I>h), we define 
[p] to be the set of hypotheses denoted by the hypothesis 
formula p. Formally, [true] = <Ph; [h] = {h}; [-,p] = 
<Ph- [p]; and [PI A P2] = [PJ] n [P2]. 
In order to ascribe a semantics to first-order formulas that 
may contain variables, we need a valuation v that assigns 
a real number to every variable. Given a valuation v, 
an evidential structure M = (S x P, £), and a world 
w = (h, ob, J.L), we can assign to a polynomial term t a 
real number [t]M,w,v in a straightforward way: 
[x]M,w,v 
[Pro(p)]M,w,v 
[Pr(p)]M,w,v 
[we( ob1, p)]M,w,v 
v(x) 
J.L( [p]) 
(J.L ttl we( ob, · ) )([p]) 
we ( ob', [p]) 
[iJt2]M,w,v 
[et]M,w,v 
[tl + t2]M,w,v 
[tJ]M,w,v X [t2]M,w,v 
8[tjM,w,v 
[t!]M,w,v + [t2]M,w,v. 
We define what it means for a formula <p to be true (or satis­
fied) at a world w of an evidential structure M = (SxP, £) 
under valuation v, written (M, w, v) I= <p, as follows: 
(M, w, v) ph ifw = (h, ob, J.L) for some ob, J.1. 
(M,w,v) p ob if w = (h, ob, f.l.) for some h, J.1. 
(M,w,v) p -,<pif(M,w,v) � <p 
(M, w, v) p <pt\1/J if(M, w, v) I= <p and (M, w, v) I= 1/J 
(M, w, v) I= t 2': a if[t]M,w,v 2': a 
(M, w, v) 1= Vx<p if (M, w, v') I= <p for all valuations v' 
that agree with v on all variables but x. 
If (M, w, v) I= <p is true for all v, we write simply 
(M, w) I= <p. It is easy to check that if <pis a closed formula 
(that is, one with no free variables), then (M, w, v) I= <p 
if and only if (M,w,v') I= <p, for all v,v'. Therefore, 
given a closed formula <p, if (M, w, v) I= <p, then in fact 
( M, w) I= <p. We will typically be concerned only with 
closed formulas. If (M, w) I= <p for all worlds w, then we 
write M I= <p and say <p is valid in M. Finally, if M I= <p 
for all evidential structures M, we write I= <p and say <pis 
valid. In the next section, we will characterize axiomati­
cally all the valid formulas of the logic. 
4 Axiomatizing evidence 
In this section we present a sound and complete axiomati­
zation for our logic. To establish this, recall the following 
standard notions. We say a formula <P is provable if it can 
be proven using t!Je axioms and rules of inferences of that 
axiom system. An axiom system is sound if every provable 
formula is valid. An axiom system is complete if every 
valid formula is provable. 
Our axiom system AX can be divided into four parts. The 
first set of axioms accounts for propositional reasoning: 
Taut. All instances of valid formulas of first-order logic 
with equality. 
MP. From <p and <p => 1/J infer 1/J. 
Instances of Taut include, for example, all formulas of the 
form <p V -,<p, where <p is an arbitrary formula of the logic. 
Axiom Taut can be replaced by a sound and complete ax­
iomatization for first-order logic with equality, as given, for 
instance, in Shoenfield [1967] or Enderton [1972]. 
The second set of axioms accounts for reasoning about 
polynomial inequalities: 
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Ineq. All instances of valid formulas about real closed 
fields, with nonlogical symbols +, · , <, 0, 1, -1. 
Valid formulas about real closed fields include, for ex­
ample, the fact that addition on the reals is associative, 
Vx'Vy'Vz( (x + y) + z = x + (y + z) ), or 1 being the identity 
for multiplication, Vx(x · 1 = x). As for Taut, we could 
replace Ineq by a sound and complete axiomatization for 
real closed fields (cf. [Fagin, Halpern, and Megiddo 1990; 
Shoenfield 1967; Tarski 1951]). 
The third set of axioms essentially captures the fact that 
there is a single hypothesis and a single observation that 
holds per state. 
Hl. h1 V ... V hn,. 
H2. hi => �hi if i i j. 
01. ob1 V ... V obn,· 
02. obi=> �obi ifi olj. 
The last set of axioms concerns reasoning about probabil­
ities and evidence proper. The axioms for probability are 
taken from FHM. 
Prl. Pr0(true) = 1. 
Pr2. Pr0(p) 2: 0. 
Pr3. Pr0(Pl 1\ P2) + Pr0(p1 1\ �p2) = Pr0(p1). 
Pr4. Pr0 (p1) = Pr0 (p2) if Pl {=> P2 is a propositional 
tautology. 
Axiom Prl simply say that the event true has probability 
1. Axiom Pr2 says that probability is nonnegative. Axiom 
Pr3 captures finite additivity. It is not possible to express 
countable additivity in our logic. On the other hand, we 
do not need countable additivity. Roughly speaking, as we 
establish in the next section, if a formula is satisfiable at all, 
it is satisfiable in a finite structure. Similar axioms capture 
posterior probability formulas: 
Pol. Pr(true) = 1. 
Po2. Pr(p) :::: 0. 
Po3. Pr(p1 1\ P2) + Pr(pl 1\ �p2) = Pr(p1). 
Po4. Pr(p1) = Pr(p2) if P1 {=> P2 is a propositional 
tautology. 
Finally, we need axioms to account for the behavior of the 
evidence operator we. What are these properties? For one 
thing, the weight function acts like a probability on hy­
potheses, for each fixed observation. This gives the fol­
lowing four axioms: 
El. we(ob,true) == 1. 
E2. we(ob,p)::C:O. 
E3. we(ob,p11\P2)+we(ob,p11\�p2) = we(ob,p1). 
E4. we( ob, pi) =we( ob, P2) if Pl {=> P2 is a proposi-
tional tautology. 
Second, evidence connects the prior and posterior beliefs 
via Dempster's Rule of Combination, as in (2). This is cap­
tured by the following axiom. (Note that, since we do not 
have division in the language, we crossmultiply to clear the 
denominator.) 
ES. ob => (Pr0(h)we(ob,h) = 
Pr(h)Pr0(h1)we(ob, h1) + . . .  + 
Pr(h)Pr0(hn,)we( ob, hn,) ). 
This is not quite enough. As we saw in Section 2, it is 
not sufficient for a function on observations and hypotheses 
to act as a probability measure on the hypotheses for each 
observation in order to be a weight of evidence function. 
Property WF2 in Theorem 2.2 is required for a function 
to be an evidence function. The following axiom captures 
WF2 in our logic: 
E6. 3xl ... 3xn,(Xl 2: 01\ . . .  I\ Xn, ::C: 0 
l\we(ob1, h1)x1 + . . .  + 
we( obn,, hl)xn, = 1 
1\ ... 
/\we( ob1, hn, )xl + . . .  + 
we( obn,, hn, )xn, = 1). 
Note that axiom E6 is the only axiom that requires quan­
tification. 
Theorem 4.1: AX is a sound and complete axiomatization 
for £_fo-ev (<Ph, <P 0) with respect to evidential structures. 
As usual, soundness is straightforward, and to prove com­
pleteness, it suffices to show that if a formula <p is con­
sistent with AX, it is satisfiable in an evidential structure. 
However, the usual approach for proving completeness in 
modal logic, which involves considering maximal consis­
tent sets and canonical structures does not work. The prob­
lem is that there are maximal consistent sets of formulas 
that are not satisfiable. For example, there is a maximal 
consistent set of formulas that includes Pr(p) > 0 and 
Pr(p) :::; 1/n for n = 1, 2, . . .. This is clearly unsatisfi­
able. Our proof follows the techniques developed in FHM. 
To express axiom E6, we needed to have quantification in 
the logic. An interesting question is whether it is possible 
to give a sound and complete axiomatization to the proposi­
tional fragment of our logic (without quantification or vari­
ables). To do this, we need to give quantifier-free axioms to 
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replace axiom E6. This amounts to asking whether there is 
a simpler property than WF2 in Theorem 2.2 that charac­
terizes weight of evidence functions. This remains an open 
question. 
5 Decision procedures 
In this section, we consider the decision problem for our 
logic, that is, the problem of deciding whether a given for­
mula 'P is satisfiable. In order to precisely state the prob­
lem, however, we need to highlight a particular subtlety of 
the logic. The language of the logic is parametrized by sets 
of primitive propositions <I>h and <!>0• In other words, we 
actually have a family of logics, indexed by <I>h and <I>0• In 
most logics, there is a certain monotonicity property that 
says that the choice of underlying primitive propositions is 
essentially irrelevant. For example, if a propositional for­
mula 'P that contains only primitive propositions in some 
set <l> is true with respect to all truth assignments to <I>, then 
it remains true with respect to all truth assignments to any 
set <I>' 2 <I>. This monotonicity property does not hold here. 
For example, axiom Hl clearly depends on the set of hy­
potheses and observations; it is no longer valid if the set is 
changed. The same is true for 01. Axioms E5 and E6 also 
depend on the set of hypotheses and observations. To deal 
with this, we assume that the satisfiability algorithm gets as 
input <l>h, <I>0, and a formula 'P E £fo-ev(<I>h, <!>0). 
Because .cto-ev(<I>h, <!>0) contains the full theory of real 
closed field, it is unsurprisingly difficult to decide. For our 
decision procedure, we can use any of the recent doubly­
exponential procedures that have been developed for the 
decision problem of the theory of real closed field [Rene­
gar 1992; Basu 1999]. 
Theorem 5.1: There is a procedure that runs in doubly­
exponential time for deciding whether a formula 'P of 
.cfo-ev ( <I>h, <I>o) is satisfiable in an evidential structure. 
This is essentially the best we can do; Weispfenning [1988] 
shows a doubly-exponential lower bound for the decision 
problem in the theory of real closed fields. 
The main culprit for the doubly exponential-time complex­
ity is the theory of real closed fields, which we had to add 
to the logic to be able to even write down axiom E6 of the 
axiomatization AX. (Recall that axiom E6 requires quan­
tification.) However, if we are not interested in axioma­
tizations, but simply in verifying properties of probabili­
ties and weights of evidence, we can consider the following 
propositional (quantifier-free) fragment of our logic, which 
we call .cev(<I>h, <!>0). This sublanguage essentially allows 
linear inequality formulas, without the use of variables or 
quantifiers. For instance, a linear inequality formula takes 
the form Pr0(p) + 3we(ob, p) + 5Pr(p') � 7. This is suf­
ficiently expressive to express many properties of interest; 
for instance, it can certainly express the relationship be-
tween prior probability and posterior probability through 
the weight of evidence of a particular observation, as shown 
in Example 3 .1. Reasoning about the propositional frag­
ment of our logic .C ev ( <I>h, <I> 0) is easier than the full lan­
guage: 
Theorem 5.2: The problem of deciding whether a formula 
'P of .c•v(<I>h, <!>0) is satisfiable in an evidential structure is 
NP-complete. 
Since .C ev ( <I>h, <!>0) allows only linear inequalities, it cannot 
express the general connection between priors, posteriors, 
and evidence captured by axiom E5. As observed in FHM, 
we can extend £ ev to allow multiplication of probability 
terms. This leads to a more expressive logic that can be 
decided in polynomial space, using Canny's [1988] proce­
dure fer deciding the validity of quantifier-free formulas in 
the theory of real closed fields. 
6 Conclusion 
We have presented in this paper a logic of evidence that 
can capture in a logical form the relationship between the 
prior probability of hypotheses, the weight of evidence of 
particular observations, and the posterior probability of hy­
potheses after the observations. The key aspect of our logic 
is that it allows reasoning about the weights of evidence 
independently of the prior probabilities. 
The evidential structures we have considered in this paper 
are essentially static, in that they model only the situation 
where a single observation is made. This Jet us focus on 
the relationship between the prior and posterior probabil­
ities on hypotheses and the weight of evidence of a sin­
gle observation. In a related paper [Halpern and Pucella 
2003], we consider evidence in the context of randomized 
algorithms; we use evidence to characterize the informa­
tion provided by, for example, a randomized algorithm for 
primality when it says that a number is prime. The frame­
work in [Halpern and Pucella 2003] is dynamic; sequences 
of observations are made over time. 
It is straightforward to extend the framework presented 
here to a dynamic setting. Rather than just considering 
states, we consider sequences of states (or runs), represent­
ing the evolution of the system over time. The models are 
now sets of runs, with a set of prior probabilities on the hy­
potheses that hold in the runs. We can then modify the logic 
to express properties of evidence in this more dynamic set­
ting. In some ways considering a dynamic setting simpli­
fies things. Rather than talking about the prior and pos­
terior probability using different operators, we need only a 
single probability operator that represents the probability of 
an hypothesis at the current time. To express the analogue 
of axiom E5 in this logic, we need to be able to talk about 
the probability at the next time step. This can be done by 
adding the "next-time" operator 0 to the logic, where O'P 
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holds at the current time if <p holds at the next time step. 
We can further extend the logic to talk about the weight of 
evidence of a sequence of observations. We leave details to 
the full paper. 
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